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The ability to interrupt memory reconsoli-
dation and thereby blunt the intensity of 
emotions associated with painful memories 
raises the ethical question, Should there to 
be a limit on efforts to manipulate our 
memories? (Debiec and Altemus, 2006). 
The answer is yes – but with important 
qualifications.
We in the West have long contemplated 
what it would mean, not just to blunt the 
emotional intensity of some memories, 
but to erase them altogether. Homer sang 
of Odysseus’s visit to a land whose inhabit-
ants ate mythical Lotus flowers, which made 
his men forget everything they ever knew 
(President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). As 
Tennyson much later retold it, Odysseus’s 
men became blissfully happy to “lie reclined 
on the hills like gods …, careless of man-
kind.” In erasing their memories, the Lotus 
flowers also erased the men’s desire to 
engage in human actions and relationships, 
and thus made them inhuman.
So, insofar as having a human self 
requires having memories, and insofar as 
erasing all of them would be tantamount 
to annihilating one’s self (Wasserman, 2004; 
Levy, 2007), we can glimpse a first point of 
easy agreement. No matter how enthusias-
tic we might generally be about using new 
technologies to shape ourselves, none of us 
would sign on for complete memory erasure; 
none of us wants to become inhuman.
If we picture memory erasure as being on 
the left end of a continuum, which stretches 
from highly undesirable forms of memory 
manipulation on the left to highly desirable 
forms on the right, then just a bit to the right 
of memory erasure would be some forms of 
memory blunting that many could readily 
agree would also be undesirable. Imagine, 
e.g., that a pharmaceutical company cre-
ates a drug that promises to relieve the suf-
fering of people haunted my memories of 
being humiliated in their workplace (Henry 
et al., 2007).
We might worry that the pharmaceuti-
cal company cared more about profit than 
consumers’ well-being. Or we might worry 
that treating a non-medical problem (the 
suffering associated with being humiliated) 
as a medical problem (in need of drug treat-
ment) is a “category mistake” – and thus bad 
in itself. I submit, however, that scenarios 
like this one bring to the surface another, 
even more fundamental objection: that it is 
bad to separate someone from her propor-
tionate response to a difficult but normal 
human experience. If someone who was 
humiliated did not feel humiliated, we would 
worry that something was terribly amiss. In 
general, we think that, rather than attempt 
to blunt the intensity of such a proportionate 
response, we should endure it and perhaps 
act on it – either by exiting the situation or 
changing it. None of us would endorse a 
drug “treatment” that threatened to alienate 
us from our experience of how we and the 
world truly are.
If easy agreement about the badness of a 
hypothetical pill for total memory erasure is 
at the left tail of the continuum, then at the 
right tail is equally easy agreement about the 
goodness of a hypothetical pill that would, 
for example, vaccinate soldiers against 
PTSD. The justification for this vaccination 
would be the same as for any other. We seek 
to prevent the onset of disorders because, 
by definition, they impair a person’s abil-
ity to flourish; they cut one off from one’s 
opportunity to engage with the world as it is. 
The vaccine would presumably insure that, 
when we laid down new memories, future 
opportunities for reconsolidation would 
elicit only responses that were proportional 
to the trigger; it would not erase traumatic 
memories nor alienate us from our experi-
ence of how we and the world truly are.
And on the continuum just to the left of 
the vaccine there will be ready agreement 
about the goodness of treating PTSD. Even 
the hardest-nosed critics of pharmacologi-
cal self-shaping, such as the Presidential 
Bioethics Council, endorse using drugs 
to blunt the sting of memories when the 
intensity of those memories is dispropor-
tionate to their cause and is impairing. 
As the Council acknowledges, traumatic 
memories associated with severe PTSD 
cast “a shadow over one’s whole life, mak-
ing the pursuit of happiness impossible.” 
(President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003, p. 
220). Like any medical treatment, memory 
blunting in this context would promote an 
individual’s ability to engage in the sorts 
of activities and relationships that human 
beings need to flourish.
Does this mean there will be no disa-
greement about the ethics of interrupting 
memory reconsolidation? No. Inevitably, 
there is a zone of ambiguity in which 
reasonable people, due to differences in 
value commitments, will reach different 
conclusions about whether the intensity of 
a given person’s emotional responses are 
proportional to their trigger. In addition 
to reasonable differences, some observers 
will make mistakes, by either wildly under- 
or over-estimating the proportionality of 
a given individual’s response. But neither 
the problem of legitimate value differences 
nor the problem of mistaken readings of 
the facts is unique to this context. Across 
the board in medicine, particularly in psy-
chiatry, patients, families, and clinicians 
have to deal with the zone of ambigu-
ity, bordered on one side by cases where 
intervention is ethically required and on 
the other by cases where not intervening 
is required.
So, we can imagine some interventions 
that would be beyond any reasonable ethical 
limit. We can agree, e.g., that it would be 
inappropriate to blunt emotional responses 
that are proportionate to a trigger (as with 
the humiliated office worker). And we can 
agree that some interventions are ethi-
cally required, e.g., when the intensity of 
an  emotional response is disproportionate 
to its trigger (as occurs with PTSD). And 
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perhaps by now we can agree that there will 
be a zone of ambiguity on the continuum 
between the region on the left where not 
intervening is called for and the region 
on the right where it is called for. Because 
that zone of ambiguity will be substantial, 
and because the chances of drawing pub-
lic policy lines that are both clear and fair 
will therefore be slim, it may be best to 
leave decisions in the zone of ambiguity to 
patients and clinicians who are committed 
to making truly informed decisions.
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